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Incarceration by its nature denies a prisoner participation in the larger
human community. To deny the opportunity to affirm membership in
a spiritual community, however, may extinguish an inmate's last
source of hope for dignity and redemption.
-Justice William J. Brennan'
When Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)2
in 1993, it aimed to increase dramatically the level of protection for inmates'
religious liberties, which had only received minimal judicial scrutiny in the
past. RFRA was primarily a response to the 1990 case of Employment Division
v. Smith,3 in which the Supreme Court refused to apply strict scrutiny review
when generally applicable laws burdened religious practices." In addition to
resurrecting strict scrutiny for these cases, RFRA extended this heightened
level of protection to the free exercise claims of prisoners. "We want religion
in the prisons," declared Senator Orrin Hatch, one of the original sponsors of
RFRA. "It is one of the best rehabilitative influences we can have. Just
because they are prisoners does not mean all of their rights should go down
the drain ....
Despite RFRA's apparent drastic change in the degree of protection for
prisoners' religious rights cases, RFRA's stated level of scrutiny is not the
controlling factor in the way many courts are deciding prisoners' free exercise
cases. The reason stems from two tendencies that have plagued the history of
the judiciary's involvement in this area of law and continue to exist under
RFRA. First, many courts have failed to understand and evaluate prisoners'
1. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabaz., 482 U.S. 342, 368 (1987) (Brennan. J.. dissenting)
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994) [hereinafter RFRAJ.
3. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4. See id. at 886 n.3.
5. 139 CONG. REC. S 14,367 (daily ed. Oct. 26. 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
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religious free exercise claims properly, resulting in the undervaluation of
burdens on religion when applying RFRA's substantial burden test.6 Second,
many courts have not employed sufficient skepticism when analyzing
penological interests. Too much deference-what this Note will call
"nonskepticism"--has led to decisions based on intuition and conjecture rather
than on empirical data and facts. As a result, prison regulations of dubious
validity and narrowness have easily passed muster despite RFRA's compelling
interest and least restrictive means tests. This lack of skepticism has
transformed RFRA's strict scrutiny into the de facto equivalent of minimal
scrutiny. Congress, in crafting RFRA, failed to recognize the power of these
tendencies to affect the outcome of the balance. By neglecting to eliminate
them, RFRA has not established a uniform heightened protection of religion
in prisons.
Part I of this Note sketches a brief history of prisoners' religious rights
before RFRA and discusses how RFRA purported to redefine the way courts
balanced religious free exercise against penological interests. Part II illustrates
why numerous courts, in spite of RFRA, have not changed how they balance
competing interests in prisoners' religious rights cases. Finally, Part III
explains how courts can improve their application of RFRA's strict scrutiny.
I. SCRIPTURE ON THE SCALES: THE TROUBLED HISTORY OF
RELIGION IN PRISONS
A. Balancing Religious Free Exercise
Judicial balancing, the dominant mode of constitutional jurisprudence in
the latter part of this century,7 has placed its imprint on the Free Exercise
Clause. Generally, when a law conflicts with a constitutional right, a judicial
balancing approach assigns values to the constitutional right and to the
governmental interest that the law seeks to achieve. The weighing of the
competing values does not occur directly, as if each were placed on a scale
with the heavier side prevailing; instead, balancing uses various levels (or tiers)
of judicial scrutiny,8 with the weight of the right (and the manner in which it
is infringed) determining the stringency of a court's review.9
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994) ("Government shall not substantiallly burden a person's
exercise of religion .... ").
7. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 943-44
(1987).
8. See id. at 946 ("Constitutional standards requiring 'compelling' or 'important' state interests also
exemplify this form of the balancing metaphor.").
9. The origins of the levels of scrutiny can be traced to the famous footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), in which the Court recognized that certain rights
would receive increased judicial protection in the form of a "more searching judicial inquiry." See also 4
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.7, at 19 (2d ed. 1992)
(discussing footnote four of Carolene Products).
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Courts employ three levels of scrutiny when reviewing laws that inhibit
constitutional rights: strict, intermediate, and minimal scrutiny. The standard
for each level of scrutiny has basically the same structure. First, courts
determine whether the government's interest-the goal of the law-meets a
certain threshold of importance. The higher the level of scrutiny, the higher the
threshold. Second, courts analyze the precision with which the law achieves
the governmental interest. The higher the level of scrutiny, the more narrowly
the government must tailor means to ends.
Strict (or "heightened") scrutiny is the most rigorous form of judicial
review; courts often refer to it as "the most rigid" 0 scrutiny or "the most
exacting"'" judicial examination. The Court has applied strict scrutiny to cases
involving content-based restrictions on speech in public fora, 2 suspect
classifications,' 3 and laws that impair fundamental rights." Under strict
scrutiny, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that its interest is
"compelling, ' 5 "paramount,"' 16 "overriding,"" or "of the highest order."'"
The law must be narrowly tailored so that the fit between means and ends is
extremely precise; in one common formulation of this tailoring, the
government must use the "least restrictive means" of achieving the law's
purpose. 9 Rarely will a law survive the searching examination of strict
scrutiny,20 leading one scholar to declare that when suspect classifications are
involved, strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."2'2
10. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that internment of lapancse ctzcns
does not violate Equal Protection Clause).
I1. Regents of the Uni,. of Cal. v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 265. 291 (1978) (holding that admissions policy
with racial quotas violates Equal Protection Clause).
12. See. e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (holding that ban on electioneering % ithin
100 feet of polling places satisfies strict scrutiny).
13. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.. 488 U.S. 469. 493-94 (1989) (rejeeting. under strict
scrutiny, city's requirement that fixed percentage of construction contracts be set aside for predominantly
racial minority-owned businesses).
14. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113. 155. 163-64 (1973) (applying stict scrutin) to abortion las&
that burdened woman's right to privacy).
15. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC. 492 U.S. 115. 126 (1989) (holding that total ban on indecent
dial-a-porn services was invalid under strict scrutiny).
16. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516. 530 (1945) (holding that statute requiring labor union organizers
to register with state before soliciting membership, as applied to unregistered union organizer %%ho gave
public speech, violated First Amendment).
17. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574. 604 (1983) (holding that denial of tax-exempt
status to religious university refusing to admit applicants engaged in interracial marrage satisfied strict
scrutiny).
18. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 215 (1972) (holding that Free Exercise clause mandated that
Amish be exempted from mandatory schooling laws).
19. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126.
20. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414. 425 (1988) (noting that burden of strict scrutiny is "',ell-ngh
insurmountable" for infringements on political speech); LAURE CE H TRIBE. AMERICA% CO'NSTrsiL'lOAL
LAW § 16-6, at 1452 (2d ed. 1988) ("T]here are very few cases which strictly scrutinize and yet uphold
instances of impaired fundamental rights.").
21. Gerald Gunther. The Supreme Court. 1971 Term-Foreword In Search of Esolling Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection. 86 HARV L REv 1. 8 (1972)
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Intermediate scrutiny requires that governmental interests be "important"22
or "substantial"23 as opposed to "overriding." Courts apply intermediate
scrutiny in cases involving gender-based classifications; 24 time, place, and
manner restrictions on speech in public fora;25 and restrictions on commercial
speech.26
Minimal scrutiny, often referred to as "rational-basis review,"2 is the
lowest form of constitutional scrutiny. When applying minimal scrutiny, courts
will uphold the law if it has a "rational relation"28  to a "legitimate
governmental purpose."29 Unlike strict scrutiny, minimal scrutiny presumes
that the law is valid and places the burden on the challenger "to negative every
conceivable basis which might support [the law]. 3° Courts will sustain a law
even if it is "based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical data.",31 Minimal scrutiny is employed when reviewing restrictions
of access to nonpublic fora,32 nonsuspect classifications,33 and infringements
on nonfundamental rights.34 As Professor Gerald Gunther observed, minimal
scrutiny is "minimal ... in theory and virtually none in fact. 35
Throughout the history of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, courts have
struggled to find the proper way to balance religion with governmental and
penological interests. Religion has been particularly difficult to place on the
scale, for courts must evaluate religious practices without becoming entangled
in theological issues. Balancing religion is particularly complicated in the
prison environment. Engulfed in problems-prison gangs, overcrowding,
violence, and riots-and exacerbated by limited finances, outdated facilities,
22. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (holding that workers' compensation
statute that treated widows differently from widowers violated Equal Protection Clause).
23. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (upholding conviction of defendant who
burned draft registration certificate in order to express antiwar beliefs).
24. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding that nursing
school's women-only admissions policy was unconstitutional).
25. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (upholding city's requirement
that performers in public parks only use sound equipment and technicians provided by city).
26, See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1980)
(holding that ban on promotional advertising by electric utilities was more extensive than necessary to
further state's interest in energy conservation and fair rate structure).
27. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (holding that involuntary commitment of mentally
retarded individuals did not violate equal protection or due process).
28. Id. at 320.
29. Id.
30. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (holding that unequal taxation of in-state and out-of-
state banks did not violate equal protection or due process).
31. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (holding that statute's distinction
between separately and commonly owned buildings for purposes of franchise requirement had rational
basis).
32. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992)
(upholding ban on face-to-face solicitation in airports but striking down ban on distribution of literature).
33. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1991) (upholding requirement that state
judges retire at age of 70).
34. See, e.g., id. at 471.
35. Gunther, supra note 21, at 8.
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and a soaring inmate population,36 prisons must accommodate the demands
of a panoply of faiths. Outside the prisons, religious adherents can select their
own diets, places of worship, and religious leaders, but in the prisons, these
aspects of religious life must be supplied and regulated by the penal institution.
Certainly incarceration necessitates some restrictions on rights, but it does
not follow that all rights should be curtailed: "There is no iron curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country."" The difficulties
of prison administration create the potential for prisons to succumb to neglect,
racism, and religious intolerance 3' and for prison officials to curtail inmates'
rights not only when necessary, but also when merely convenient. To protect
prisoners' right to the free exercise of religion, judges must employ some
degree of scrutiny. The difficult issue is determining the extent to which rights
must be curtailed and how carefully courts should probe into prison
administration.
Complicating the balancing is the fact that prison administration is fraught
with uncertainty. Penology is not a rigorous science but a set of ad hoc
procedures, uncertain goals, and ambivalent and underanalyzed policies that
vary widely from prison to prison. 9 In Governing Prisons,"' John J. Dilulio,
Jr. notes that there is a dearth of trustworthy information concerning prison
management,4 no uniformity among prisons concerning penological goals,' 2
and only "fragmentary knowledge and untried opinions about how to improve
prisons.'1 3 During the 1960s and 1970s, forty-two states drastically reformed
their prison systems, yet "[tihose responsible for these major organizational
overhauls were mostly unaware of the related activities of other states. "
The efficacy and effects of prison policies are often shaded with doubt,
and judges must make decisions in the face of uncertainty. Will
accommodating certain religions incite animosity in other prisoners'? Will
making too many accommodations eviscerate the prison's control over
36. The prison population has more than quadrupled in the last 20 )ears, from 196.429 in 1970 to
910,080 in 1993. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U1,tTED STATES 217
(1995).
37. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (holding that pnon disciplinar) proceedings
must meet minimal due process requirements).
38. See infra Section I.C; see also Ross v. Coughlin. 669 F Supp 1235. 1238 (S D N Y 1987)
("When Ross explained that he only ate kosher food, he was allegedly told. 'Where the tuck do you think
you are, a Holiday Inn. You eat what's here or starve, cause you're in my home no%%. and I don't cater to
no Jew bastards."') (quoting prison official); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail % senstadt. 360 F Supp
676, 679-84 (D. Mass. 1973) (describing prison as run-down, vermin-infested. filthy, and o'ercroded)
39. See JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORREcIONAL
MANAGEMENT 167-84 (1987); Norval Morris. The Contemporary Prison: 1965-Present. in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON 227, 227 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds.. 1995)
40. DIIULIO, supra note 39.
41. See id. at 11.
42. See id. at 249.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 237.
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inmates? Will the cumulative cost of accommodations deplete limited prison
resources?
Any accommodation of religion involves the potential for resentment, and
any change in existing prison policy presents the possibility of danger. Almost
all decisions invoke the fear of the slippery slope. These risks and uncertainties
can easily lead to a complete refusal to make accommodations, and
consequently, to the demise of judicial protection for prisoners' religious
liberty. To safeguard prisoners' free exercise rights, judges cannot retreat from
the task of balancing, no matter how daunting it may appear.
B. Free Exercise in Flux
Outside of the prisons, the Supreme Court's difficulty in finding an
appropriate balance between religious free exercise and governmental interests
led to the gradual formation, extensive erosion, and eventual abandonment of
a strict scrutiny standard of review. Ultimately, the troubles of balancing
religion resulted in the creation of RFRA-one of the most important chapters
in the evolution of free exercise jurisprudence.
Initially, the Court did not use a balancing approach when deciding free
exercise cases. In its earliest free exercise decision, Reynolds v. United
States, 5 the Court held that Mormons should not be exempted from a
generally applicable law prohibiting polygamy because exemptions for free
exercise would "make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
law of the land."46 Nowhere in the opinion did the Court speak in terms of
balancing. Around the middle of the twentieth century, the Court began
employing the rudiments of a balancing approach, requiring a tight link
between legislative means and ends when religion was burdened.47 The Court
also began to examine whether religious exemptions could be made from laws
of general applicability.4
8
Finally, in 1963, the Court began applying strict scrutiny in free exercise
cases. In Sherbert v. Verner,49 the Court granted unemployment compensation
to employees dismissed because of conflicts between their work duties and
their religion. After explicitly rejecting the "rational relationship" test, the
Court applied strict scrutiny.50 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,51 the Court exempted
45. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
46. Id. at 167.
47. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943) (holding nondiscriminatory ordinance
regulating solicitation was not "narrowly drawn"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)
(requiring statute prohibiting solicitation and inciting breaches of peace to be "narrowly drawn"); see also
TRIBE, supra note 20, § 14-13, at 1253 (discussing Murdock and Cannvell).
48. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961) (holding that Free Exercise Clause did not
require Jewish store owner to be exempted from mandatory Sunday closing laws).
49. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
50. See id. at 406.
51. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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the Amish from mandatory schooling laws, stating that "only those interests
of the highest order ... can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion. 52
Strict scrutiny of free exercise claims differed slightly from strict scrutiny
in other contexts. When laws burdening protected speech or involving suspect
classifications failed strict scrutiny, the Court invalidated them. However, when
a law that burdened religion failed strict scrutiny, the Court made an exception
for the religious practice, and the law remained applicable to others. Thus the
Court examined the narrow tailoring requirement in terms of whether an
exception to the law could serve as a less restrictive alternative. In Yoder, for
example, the Court concluded that "it was incumbent on the State to show with
more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education
would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish."" In
essence, the strict scrutiny test for free exercise cases balanced the need for
uniformity in the law's application with the burden on religion. Another,
perhaps more crucial difference, was that courts would not scrutinize a law
unless the plaintiff established that the burden on her religion was
"substantial. '
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Court continued to articulate the
strict scrutiny standard of Sherbert and Yoder for neutral laws of general
applicability that infringed on the free exercise of religion." However, in
applying this standard, the Court weakened its stringency, and the religious
liberty frequently lost to the governmental interest" or was found not to be
substantially burdened.5 The Court's dilution of the strict scrutiny standard
52. Id. at 215.
53. Id. at 236.
54. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
55. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization. 493 U S 378. 384-85 (1990)
(applying scrutiny of Yoder to generally applicable sales tax); Hemandez v. Commissioner. 490 U S 680.
699 (1989) (applying scrutiny of Yoder to denial of charitable deduction for pa)mcnts to Church of
Scientology for training sessions); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec. 489 U S 829. 835 (1989)
("[Tihere may exist state interests sufficiently compelling to override a legitimate claim to the free exercise
of religion. No such interest has been presented here.") Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Comm'n. 480
U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (applying "strict scrutiny" of Sherbert to dental of unemployment benefits to person
discharged for refusing to work on her Sabbath); Bob Jones Untv v Unted States. 461 U S 574. 604
(1983) (applying strict scrutiny to denial of tax-exempt status to university that refuscd admission to
applicants engaged in interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marage or dating). United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (applying scrutiny of Yoder and Sherbert to requirement that
Amish participate in social security system); Thomas v. Review Bd.. 450 U S 707. 718 (1981) (applying
scrutiny of Yoder to denial of unemployment benefits to claimant who quit because of religious objections
to producing armaments).
56. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 394-97 (holding that generally applicable sales
tax passed strict scrutiny even when tax was applied to religtous matenals) Hernandez. 490 U S at 700
(holding that denial of charitable deduction for payments to Church of Sctentolog) for training sesstons
satisfied strict scrutiny); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 (holding denial of tax-exempt status to religious
university refusing to admit applicants engaged in interracial marnage passed stict scrutiny). Lee. 455 U S
at 257-58, 260 (concluding that uniform participation in social secunty system passed stict scrutiny even
when participation in system was barred by religious doctinne).
57. See. e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries. 493 U.S. at 391-92 (holding that sales tax applied to
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culminated in Employment Division v. Smith.5 8 In Smith, a Native American
who was fired from a state job for his religious use of peyote, argued that the
Free Exercise Clause required that he receive unemployment compensation. In
denying his claim, the Court held that as long as a law was generally
applicable and not designed to discriminate against a particular religion, the
fact that it burdened religious freedom was irrelevant.5 9 The Court explicitly
rejected the ad hoc judicial balancing approach for free exercise
accommodation cases:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices
that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.'
Smith eliminated strict scrutiny for free exercise claims involving neutral,
generally applicable laws 6' and put the courts out of the balancing business.
C. Prisoners' Religious Rights
Judicial scrutiny of prisoners' rights is a recent phenomenon. Until the
1960s, courts followed a "hands off' policy, rarely peeking into the shadowy
realm of prison operation.62 In the oft-quoted statement of one court, a
prisoner was "the slave of the State., 63 Courts were reluctant to scrutinize
prisoners' rights claims because of concerns about federalism and separation
of powers, as well as a lack of familiarity with penology and prison
administration. 64
Starting in the 1960s and 1970s, courts began to order that prisons be
reformed. 5 Courts intervened in prison administration because of inhumane
conditions such as severe overcrowding, poor sanitation, and high levels of
violence.66 Judicial review of prison affairs also increased due to religious
religious materials was not "constitutionally significant" burden); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988) (holding that only burdens on religion that "coerce
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs" require Sherbert's level of scrutiny).
58. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
59. See id. at 888-90.
60. Id. at 890.
61. See id. at 886 n.3. For a vigorous critique of Smith, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990).
62. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. SELKE, PRISONS IN CRISIS 28-29 (1993); RICHARD G. SINGER & WILLIAM
P. STATSKY, RIGHTS OF THE IMPRISONED 581 (1974).
63. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
64. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
65. See SELKE, supra note 62, at 28-36.
66. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354-61 (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing instances of
indecent prison conditions that spurred courts to intercede in prison affairs).
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and racial discrimination. Several cases brought by African-American Islamic
prisoners involving egregiously discriminatory treatment of prisoners based on
their Muslim beliefs-commonly referred to as the "Black Muslim
cases"-spurred even traditionally deferential courts to become more involved
with the prisons. For example, in Sewell v. Pegelow, 67 two complaints alleged
that all thirty-eight Muslims in the United States Reformatory at Lorton,
Virginia, were kept in isolation for three months, denied medical care, and
provided with insufficient nourishment. None of the Muslims had violated any
disciplinary rule.68 Unlike adherents of other religions, they were not allowed
to wear metal symbols of their faith or consult with religious advisers. The
court, while noting that "the maintenance of discipline in a prison is an
executive function with which the judicial branch ordinarily will not
interfere, 69 held that the gravity of the allegations was sufficient to require
a hearing.7° In similar cases, courts began to require hearings rather than
summarily dismiss claims, departing from the policy of noninvolvement in
prison affairs.7
By the late 1970s, thirty-two state prison systems faced constitutional
challenges.72 Cruz i Beto73 was the first prisoner religious rights case to
reach the Supreme Court. In Cruz, a Buddhist inmate was forbidden from
worshipping in the prison chapel and from speaking to his religious advisor.
When he shared his religious materials with other inmates, prison officials
locked him in solitary confinement for two weeks on a diet of only bread and
water. While the prison provided Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant chaplains,
services, classes, and texts, it provided nothing for Buddhist worshippers.
Moreover, prisoners who attended religious services were rewarded with
"points of good merit" which increased "a prisoner's eligibility for desirable
job assignments and early parole consideration."' 7 Despite the gravity of the
prisoner's allegations, the district court summarily dismissed the complaint out
of deference to prison officials, and the court of appeals affirmed.' The
Supreme Court reversed, stating that while "prison officials must be accorded
latitude in the administration of prison affairs," federal courts must 'enforce
67. 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
68. See id. at 197.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 198.
71. See Ross v. Blackledge, 477 F.2d 616. 619 (4th Cir. 1973) (requirng heanng on pnson's denial
of pork-free diet to Black Muslims); Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F2d 1201. 1202 (4th Cir 1971) (requirng
hearing on prison's denial of paid Black Muslim minister and pork-frce dtets for Black Muslm inmatcs.
Williford v. California. 352 F.2d 474. 476 (9th Cir. 1965) (requtrng heanng on alleged s)stcmatc
harassment of Black Muslims); Brown %v. McGinnis, 180 N.E.2d 791. 793 (N Y 1962) (requinng heanng
of prison's denial of Black Muslim ministers and services).
72. See C. Ronald Huff, The Discover. of Prisoners' Rtghts. in LEGAL RIGHTS OF PRISOERS 47. 51
(Geoffrey P. Alpert ed.. 1980).
73. 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
74. Id. at 320.
75. See id. at 321.
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the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including prisoners. 76 However, the
Court did not establish a clear standard for the proper degree of scrutiny for
prisoners' religious liberty cases.
In the decade following Cruz, the Supreme Court upheld regulations
infringing on prisoners' other First Amendment rights if the regulations were
a "rational response ' 77 or "rationally related"78 to the penological interest.
Consistent across these cases was the Court's high level of deference to prison
administrators. In Pell v. Procunier,79 the Court rejected a First Amendment
challenge to a ban on prisoners' rights to interview with the media because
decisions about penological interests were "within the province and
professional expertise of corrections officials."80 Unless the record contained
"substantial evidence" that administrators exaggerated these interests, "courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters."8t The Court
used similar deferential language in Bell v. Wolfish 82 when it upheld a
regulation prohibiting prisoners from obtaining hardback books not mailed
directly from publishers, book clubs, or bookstores.83 Thus, the Supreme
Court was beginning to fashion a minimal scrutiny standard for prisoners' First
Amendment liberties.
However, after the Court handed down these decisions, lower courts
continued to apply differing levels of scrutiny to prisoners' constitutional
complaints, especially in cases involving inmates' religious rights claims."
This uneven scrutiny can be observed in cases involving prison policies
regulating hair length that conflicted with religious practices of growing long
hair and beards.85 Prisons sought to justify their policies with penological
76. Id.
77. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979) (upholding regulation preventing prisoners from
receiving hardcover books from source other than bookstore, book publisher, or book club).
78. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (upholding regulations
curtailing prisoner involvement in labor unions).
79. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
80. Id. at 827.
81. Id.
82. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
83. See id. at 551; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974) (explaining that courts
should remain deferential to prison officials because "courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly
urgent problems of prison administration and reform").
84. Some courts required a level of scrutiny close to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Shabazz v. Bamauskas,
790 F.2d 1536, 1539 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (applying "less restrictive means test"); Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670
F.2d 1345, 1346 (4th Cir. 1982) (examining prison regulation for "less restrictive alternatives"). More
frequently, courts required a minimal level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Brown v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 408,412 (6th
Cir. 1984) (holding that infringement on free exercise must be "reasonably related" to maintaining security);
Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 960 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring that prison regulation have "important
objective" and be "reasonably adapted to achieving that objective"); Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1215
(8th Cir. 1982) (rejecting "least restrictive alternative" test in favor of reasonableness test); St. Claire v.
Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1980) (requiring only that state "produce evidence" that accommodating
free exercise right "would create a potential danger to institutional security").
85. For some adherents, the practice of growing long hair and beards originates from language in the
Bible. See Leviticus 19:27 ("Ye shall not round the comers of your heads, neither shalt thou mar the
comers of thy beard.").
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interests such as facilitating identification, preventing prisoners from hiding
contraband in their hair, reducing the time and physical contact involved in
searching prisoners, and reducing the number of assaults by "'predatory
homosexuals. '' 6
Some courts remained skeptical of these prison policies and took
affirmative steps to investigate them. In Moskowitz v. Wilkinson,"7 a court-
requested survey of forty-five state prison systems revealed that twenty-three
allowed beards while twenty-two did not,88 indicating that prison policy
across the country was sharply divided on this issue. Based on this survey, the
court held that because such a substantial number of prisons permitted beards,
the antibeard regulation did not appear to be so essential for prison safety that
it should override the prisoner's religious rights. 9  In Gallahan 1:
Hollyfield,9° the court found that a Cherokee prisoner's asserted free exercise
right to grow his hair long due to his religious traditions outweighed the
prison's interest in prohibiting long hair. The court ruled that "less restrictive
alternatives" were available, such as pulling the hair back in a ponytail and
searching it for contraband.9'
Other courts, however, were considerably more deferential toward prison
administrators, refusing to second guess their discretion except in the most
extreme cases. In Cole v. Flick,92 the court upheld a prison's hair regulation
that infringed on the asserted free exercise rights of a Cherokee Indian to grow
his hair long.93 The court held that "once the state proffers sincerely held and
arguably correct beliefs regarding the necessity of a regulation ... the burden
is on the prisoner to make a showing by substantial evidence that these beliefs
are unreasonable or that the regulation is an exaggerated response."' As the
need for hair regulations was far from certain (as indicated by the Moskowitz
survey), the extent to which prisoners' free exercise rights could outweigh
penological interests turned on how carefully courts would question the
justifications offered by prison officials.
In 1987, the Supreme Court, in Turner v. Safley9s and O'Lone v. Estate
of Shabazz,96 established a test for balancing prison regulations against
prisoners' religious rights. In Turner, a case involving inmate mail and
marriage restrictions, the Court articulated a minimal scrutiny test for
prisoners' rights claims: "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
86. Cole v. Flick, 758 F.2d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 1985).
87. 432 F Supp. 947 (D. Conn. 1977).
88. See id. at 950 n.8.
89. See id. at 950-51.
90. 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982).
91. See id at 1346-47.
92. 758 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1985).
93. See id. at 131-32.
94. Id.
95. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
96. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
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constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests. 97 The test also considered other factors: the
existence of alternative means for prisoners to exercise their rights; the impact
that accommodation would have on guards, inmates, and prison resources; and
the alternatives available to the regulation that would accommodate the
prisoner's religious practice "at de minimis cost." 98
In O'Lone, the Court applied the Turner test to a case dealing explicitly
with prisoners' free exercise rights. O'Lone involved prison work policies that
prevented Muslim prisoners from attending Jumu'ah, a Friday service
commanded by the Qur'an.99 The Court concluded that there was a "logical
connection" between the regulation and the legitimate penological interests of
safety and rehabilitation.' °° The Court also found that Muslim prisoners
could express their faith in alternative ways, listing practices that Muslims
could engage in at the prison.'"' Finally, the Court examined whether less
burdensome alternatives were available at de minimis cost. Out of deference,
the Court did not require the prison officials to prove the unavailability of less
burdensome alternatives.'0 2 Thus the regulation passed muster under the
Turner test.
Turner and O'Lone were not significant retreats in prisoner rights
protection; they simply clarified what numerous courts were already doing.
However, the Court crystallized the degree of scrutiny at the lowest level that
courts had been using-a scrutiny so meager and deferential that it
approximated the "hands off' doctrine.
D. The Genesis of RFRA
The Court's judicial restraint in Smith and O'Lone had all but eviscerated
the judiciary's role in balancing religious liberty against governmental and
penological interests: Smith delegated the task of balancing to the legislature
while O'Lone surrendered it to prison officials.
Congress, however, placed the responsibility of balancing back on the
courts. Spurred by a diverse coalition of religious groups,' 3 Congress created
RFRA in response to Smith, rejecting Smith's holding that the balancing should
be done by legislatures rather than judges. As the House Report declared: "It
97. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
98. Id. at 89-91.
99. See Qur'an 62:9 (A. Yusuf Ali trans., 1983).
100. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 350-51.
101. See id. at 352 (listing practices such as consulting with religious leaders, eating pork-free meals,
fasting during Ramadan, and worshipping in congregation except during working hours).
102. See id. at 350.
103. The coalition, called the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, was composed of over 50
religious organizations. For a partial list of these groups, see 139 CONG. REc. S 14,362 (daily ed. Oct. 26,
1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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is not feasible to combat the burdens of generally applicable laws on religion
by relying upon the political process for the enactment of separate religious
exemptions in every Federal, State, and local statute.""." In addition,
Congress criticized Smith's level of protection for the free exercise of religion,
observing that neutral laws of general applicability often severely threatened
this fundamental liberty.'0 5 Senator Hatch, one of RFRA's original sponsors,
declared: "The elimination of the compelling interest standard has led to a
string of lower court decisions eroding freedom of religion in a wide variety
of areas .... The Smith case was wrongly decided and the only way to change
it is with this legislation."' '°
RFRA's preamble asserted that "in [Smith] the Supreme Court virtually
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious
exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion." 117 The purpose of RFRA
was to "restore the compelling interest test as set forth in [Sherbert] and
[Yoder]."' 8 RFRA mandated that the "[gjovernment shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability" except if the government demonstrates a "compelling
governmental interest" and the government uses "'the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest."'" This is the language of
strict scrutiny."0 RFRA displaced Smith, creating a new statutory right to
free exercise that would be protected with the most rigorous scrutiny.'
Smith was not RFRA's only target, for RFRA also undermined 0'Loie.
Both the Senate and House Reports sharply criticized O'Lone and stated that
RFRA would eliminate O'Lone's minimal scrutiny standard for prisoners' free
exercise cases." 2  Accordingly, RFRA mandated that cases involving
prisoners' religious free exercise be reviewed with the same strict scrutiny as
regular free exercise cases,' 3 promising prisoners a significant increase in
the protection of their free exercise rights.
The extension of strict scrutiny to the prisons was one of the most hotly
debated aspects of RFRA. A unanimous letter from all lifty state prison
104. H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 6 (1993).
105. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 4-5 (1993). reprinted it: 1993 U S C C A N 1Y92. 1 693-94. t1 R
REP. No. 103-88, at 2 (1993).
106. 139 CONG. REC. S14,353 (daily cd. Oct. 26. 19931 (siateinent of Sen Ilatchi
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (1994) (citations onitted)
108. Id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
109. Id. §§ 2000bb-l(a)-(b).
110. See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text (discussing stict s-rutin I
111. There has been a vigorous debate concerning the constitutionait% of RFRA See Chr,,topher L
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager. IWhy the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconjtittional, 69
N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1994); Bonnie 1. Robin-Vergeer. Disposing of the Red Iltrriui 5 A Defense of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589 (1996)
112. See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9-11 (1993). reprinted in 1993 U S C C AN 1892. 189-1901., R
REP. No. 103-88, at 7-8 (1993).
113. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 1. reprinted in 1993 U S C C A N 1892. 1900-01. It R RH-' No
103-88, at 7-8.
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directors implored Congress not to apply RFRA to the prisons because
RFRA's "dramatic change in the legal standard applied in prison litigation will
necessarily result in a dramatic increase in the amount and cost of litigation
and will have a deleterious impact on security and limited prison
resources." 114 Responding to these concerns, Senator Harry Reid introduced
an amendment to exempt prisons from RFRA.
' 5
Members of the Senate vigorously debated the amendment." 6 Senator
Reid argued that strict scrutiny was too exacting a standard for prison officials
to satisfy, requiring "full-blown evidentiary hearings" and permitting courts "to
second guess prison officials on virtually every decision of prison
administration." ' 17 Supporters of the Reid amendment contended that RFRA
would increase already burgeoning prisoner litigation, entice prisoners to dress
frivolous claims in the vestments of religion, place a severe strain on prison
resources and finances, endanger prison security, and frustrate the ability of
prison officials to control prisoners." 8
Others strongly opposed the Reid amendment, including a multitude of
religious groups" 9 and Attorney General Janet Reno, the supervisor of the
federal prison system. 20  Numerous senators asserted that the Reid
amendment would inhibit legitimate claims but fail to halt abusive lawsuits and
attested that free exercise cases accounted for only a minuscule percentage of
prisoner litigation.' 2' In addition, many senators-both conservative and
liberal-underscored the rehabilitative aspects of religion for inmates. 2 ' For
example, Senator Bob Dole argued: "[I]f religion can help just a handful of
prison inmates get back on track, then the inconvenience of accommodating
their religious beliefs is a very small price to pay."'' 23 Similarly, Senator
Edward Kennedy declared: "We would encourage prisoners to be religious.
There is every reason to believe that doing so will increase the likelihood that
a prisoner will be rehabilitat[ed]."' 24  The Senate rejected the Reid
114. 139 CONG. REc. S14,355 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Reid) (quoting letter).
115. See id. at S14,353.
116. See id. at S14,353-68; 139 CONG. REc. S14,461-68 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).
117. 139 CONG. REc. S 14,354 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen, Reid),
118. See id. at S 14,354-61 (statements of Sens. Reid and Simpson).
119. See id. at S14,362 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
120. See id. at S14,351 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (discussing letter from Attorney General Janet
Reno to Senate Judiciary Committee).
121. See 139 CONG. REc. S14,462 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lieberman) (observing
that free exercise cases only account for two percent of all prisoner litigation); id. at S 14,464 (statement
of Sen. Coats) (observing that free exercise cases account for less than one percent of prisoner civil rights
cases in Ohio); id. at S 14,466 (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (observing that free exercise cases account for
only one percent of prisoner litigation in New York).
122. See id. at S14,461-66 (statements of Sens. Hatch, Lieberman, Coats, Dole, Hatfield, and
Danforth).
123. Id. at S14,466.
124. 139 CONG. REc. S 14,351 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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amendment by a vote of 58 to 41,'2 and on November 16, 1993, President
Clinton signed RFRA into law.
E. RFRA's Heightened Protection
A textual comparison of the standards of RFRA and O'Lone reveals that
the scrutiny mandated by RFRA is significantly more rigorous. Under O'Lone,
the governmental interest must only be "legitimate" to outweigh a prisoner's
free exercise of religion; in contrast, RFRA requires a "compelling"
governmental interest. Whereas O'Lone merely requires that there be no less
burdensome alternatives to the regulation at de minimis cost, RFRA demands
that the regulation be the "least restrictive means."
RFRA's legislative history, especially the rejection of the Reid amendment,
indicates that numerous members of Congress intended to heighten the scrutiny
for prisoners' religious rights. According to the Senate Report, "Prior to
O'Lone, courts used a balancing test in cases where an inmate's free exercise
rights were burdened by an institutional regulation; only regulations based
upon penological concerns of the 'highest order' could outweigh an inmate's
claims."' 2 6 The Report stated that O'Lone "weakened this standard" and that
the "intent of [RFRA] is to restore traditional protection afforded to prisoners'
claims prior to O'Lone."'
' 27
The House Report also asserted that RFRA would heighten O'Lone's
minimal scrutiny to strict scrutiny. 'IS Like the Senate Report, the House
Report argued that the pre-O'Lone case law had established a strict scrutiny
standard for religious free exercise in prisons: "Prior to 1987, courts evaluated
free exercise challenges by prisoners under the compelling governmental
interest test .... Strict scrutiny of prison regulations did not automatically
assure prisoners of success in court."'' 2 9 The Report went on to declare that
O'Lone lowered this strict scrutiny to a test in which "burdens on prisoners'
free exercise of their religion are more easily upheld" and that RFRA would
restore this heightened level of scrutiny. 30
The Senate and House Reports, however, improperly characterized the pre-
O'Lone case law as almost uniformly reviewing prisoners' free exercise cases
with strict scrutiny. In fact, the pre-O'Lone case law was uneven and
ambiguous, and numerous courts applied a level of scrutiny quite similar to
that of O'Lone.'3 ' Although both Reports read the pre-O'Lone case law as
125. See 139 CONG. REC. S14,468 (daily ed. Oct. 27. 1993)
126. S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9-10 (1993). reprinted in 1993 U S C C A N 1892. 1899
127. Id. at 10.
128. See H.R. REP. No. 103-88. at 7-8 (1993).
129. Id. at 7.
130. See id.
131. See supra Section I.C.
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much more clearly defined and protective than it actually was, both
unequivocally stated that the O'Lone standard was too weak and that RFRA
would heighten the protection. 132 Based on the Reports and the vigorous
Senate debate, Congress appears to have intended to increase the protection
afforded to prisoners' religious liberties. Congress believed that RFRA was
restoring a rigorous level of scrutiny that demanded that prison officials justify
their policies with sufficient evidence. 33 The supporters of RFRA's
heightened protection of prisoners' religious rights regarded religion as a
liberty so fundamental that it deserved strong protection in the prisons.
3 4
F. RFRA's Failed Redemption
Despite the hopes of its drafters, RFRA has not significantly increased the
protection of prisoners' religious rights. The infirmity of RFRA does not
originate from the statute itself, but in the way that courts are applying it.
Numerous courts articulate RFRA's strict scrutiny standard but nevertheless
continue to decide cases in a manner that impersonates O'Lone.
In one sense, RFRA has done exactly what Congress said it was designed
to do: turn back the clock to the law before O'Lone. Indeed, the post-RFRA
case law is a reflection of the jurisprudence before O'Lone. But in another
sense, RFRA has entirely failed to achieve Congress's objectives. RFRA was
passed in the spirit of respecting the importance of religious faith. Congress
rejected O'Lone because its scrutiny was too meager for such an essential
liberty. Yet RFRA has spawned a mass of confusing and inconsistent case law
in which many courts have shown little respect and understanding for
prisoners' religious claims and have neglected to examine prison policies in
any meaningful way. These problematic elements in many courts' balancing
approaches to prisoners' religious free exercise are the same components from
which O'Lone was constructed.
II. PENOLOGICAL SINS: BALANCING PRISONERS' RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
UNDER RFRA
RFRA's failure to provide an effective, uniform, heightened standard of
review for prisoners' free exercise stems from two problematic trends in the
way courts have balanced, and continue to balance, religion with penological
interests: (1) insensitive approaches toward weighing prisoners' religious
132. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 10-lI (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892. 1900-01. H.R.
REP. No. 103-88, at 7-8.
133. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 10-1 I; H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 7-8.
134. For the specific comments and rationales of supporters of RFRA's heightened protection of
prisoners' religious free exercise, see 139 CONG. REc. S14,461-71 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993); 139 CONG.
REC. S14,350-68 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993).
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rights; and (2) nonskeptical approaches toward weighing penological interests.
These trends, prevalent in the pre-O'Lone case law and culminating in O 'Lone,
continue to thrive under RFRA.
A. Insensitivity Toward Evaluating Burdens on Religion
RFRA resurrects the substantial burden test, the threshold requirement that
must be satisfied before courts will evaluate the governmental interest.
Determining whether a regulation substantially burdens religion has been, and
continues to be, a task of excruciating difficulty. Judges have long recognized
that making substantive judgments about religious matters is not within the
proper function or competence of the judiciary. As the Supreme Court declared
in Thomas v. Review Board:'35 "Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation."'' 36 Unfortunately, courts must define the scope of what
constitutes a religion; otherwise, any litigant can obtain the highest level of
scrutiny by characterizing her actions as religious. Courts must also develop
some method of evaluating the extent to which laws infringe upon religion;
otherwise, government would be required to tiptoe on eggshells, forced to
litigate and justify every law that caused the most minuscule inconvenience on
religion. Accordingly, courts have had to finesse the line between defining and
evaluating religion and making theological judgments.
The pre-RFRA case law reveals two basic trends in how courts have
approached this most delicate of tasks. Sometimes, judges have adopted an
open-minded approach, affording a high level of sensitivity towards the
adherent's claims about her religion. 37 For example, the Court in Thomas
declared that a substantial burden exists when government places "substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs."',3
According to Thomas, beliefs that were illogical, incomprehensible, and not
fully developed would be protected, as well as idiosyncratic deviances from the
traditional dogma of religious groups. 39 Respectful to the claims of the
adherent, this tolerant approach focused on the harms imposed by government
regulation rather than on judges' opinions about the importance of the religious
practice.
On other occasions, however, courts evaluated burdens on religion from
a more closed-minded approach. In O'Lone, the Court held that a regulation
preventing Muslim inmates from attending Jumu'ah was justified, in part,
135. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
136. Id. at 716.
137. See. e.g., Sherbert v. Vemer. 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that substantial burden exists
when adherent is pressured, even by financial burden. to choose whether or not to follow "'precepts" of her
religion); Teterud v. Bums. 522 F.2d 357, 360 (8th Cir. 1975) (-Proof that the practice is decpl) rooted
in religious belief is sufficient.").
138. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
139. See id. at 714-16.
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because Muslims at the prison could "observe a number of their religious
obligations."'' 40 In this approach, the Court imposed its own preconception
about religious devotion-that religious practices are fungible-when
evaluating the burdens on free exercise. While several courts under RFRA
have maintained the former, more sensitive method when evaluating burdens
on religion,' 4' many have continued to contort particular faiths to judicially
constructed models of religion.
In the most common instance of the latter approach, courts applying RFRA
have held that the burden must interfere with a "central tenet" of the religion
or with a practice "mandated" by the religion. 42 The central tenet test,
however, understands religion in a very narrow manner, leading many courts
applying RFRA to dismiss any practice not deemed absolutely obligatory.
Using this approach, courts have thrown out RFRA cases involving restrictions
on receiving religious literature, 43 engaging in congregate worship,'"
obtaining access to religious leaders, 45 and possessing sacred objects'46
140. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987).
141. See, e.g., Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that substantial burden
"is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously motivated conduct"); Karolis v. New
Jersey Dep't of Corrections, No. CIV.A.95-2241 (JEI), 1996 WL 411134, at *3 (D.N.J. July 19, 1996)
(adopting test of Thomas); Muslim v. Frame, 891 F. Supp. 226, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that
substantial burden is one that affects "a practice motivated by a sincere religious belief"). Some courts have
abstained from applying the substantial burden test altogether, opting to decide the case solely on the
compelling state interest prong. See, e.g., Phipps v. Parker, 879 F. Supp. 734, 736 (W.D. Ky. 1995) ("[The
court is not in a position to judge the centrality of this religious belief to [the prisoner's] free exercise of
religion.").
142. See, e.g., Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 65 F.3d 489, 491-92 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that practice must be "essential" or "fundamental"); Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th
Cir. 1995) (holding that burden must violate "central tenet" of religious beliefs); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d
948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that burden must prevent mandated practice or interfere with central tenet
of faith).
143. See, e.g., Hunter v. Baldwin, No. 95-35330, 1996 WL 95046, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996)
("in1here is nothing in the record to indicate that Hunter's faith mandated that he receive and read the
religious pamphlet in question."); Shabazz v. Parsons, No. 95-6267, 1996 WL 5548, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan.
8, 1996) (holding that denial of several issues of Muhammad Speaks to Nation of Islam prisoner was not
substantial burden because "[h]e has not been denied the ability to engage in religious activities, and he
still is capable of expressing his adherence to his faith").
144. See, e.g., Smith v. Beatty, No. 95-1493, 1996 WL 166270, at *2 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 1996) (finding
that denial of communal worship was not substantial burden); Wynn v. McManus, No. 95-35466, 1996 WL
32110, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 1996) (holding that prisoner who could only attend one Sunday service every
five weeks "failed to establish that any tenet of his religious faith mandated attendance at services every
Sunday"); Muhammad v. New York Dep't of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 161, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding
that prisoner "has not demonstrated that the generic Muslim service offends or ignores particular practices
or beliefs that are mandated by [Nation of Islam] teachings"); Best v. Kelly, 879 F. Supp. 305, 308
(W.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that prohibition on Jewish inmate from engaging in congregational meetings was
not substantial burden).
145. See, e.g., Davidson v. Davis, No. 92 Civ. 4040 (SWK), 1995 WL 60732, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
14, 1995) (holding that denial of access to rabbi was not substantial burden on Jewish inmate).
146. See, e.g., Miller-Bey v. Schultz, No. 94-1583, 1996 WL 67941, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1996)
(per curiam) (holding that prison's disposal of Moorish Science Temple practitioner's nationality card,
which must be kept at all times, was not substantial burden); Reese v. Coughlin, No. 93 Civ. 4748 (LAP),
1996 WL 374166, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 3. 1996) (holding that Wicca practitioner's "allegation that tarot
cards are 'like a Bible' to him only establishes that the cards are important to him" rather than mandated
by religion).
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because these activities were not "mandated" by the prisoner's faith.
The central tenet approach incorrectly views religion as a set of clear
commands and injunctions. In contrast, sacred texts are often ambiguous and
subject to a myriad of interpretations; leaders and practitioners of the same
religious group often disagree about what practices are essential.' 7
Additionally, the central tenet test dismisses practices not explicitly
commanded by a religious authority but necessary for an adherent to express
her faith. As Judge Richard Posner aptly observed:
Many religious practices that clearly are not mandatory, such as
praying the rosary, in the case of Roman Catholics, or wearing
yarmulkes, in the case of Orthodox Jews (optional because while
Jewish men are required to cover their heads, the form of the head
covering is not prescribed), are important to their practitioners, who
would consider the denial of them a grave curtailment of their
religious liberty. 48
Rarely are there any religious practices that are absolutely obligatory, for often
religions provide special exemptions for those suffering particular hardships.
For example, a Muslim's obligation to participate in even the most important
practices, including the fast during the month of Ramadan and the prohibition
on eating pork, are excused when adherents are constrained.' 9 In fact, the
existence of such a special exception led the court in the post-RFRA case of
Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Department of Corrections'50 to conclude that
the inability to attend Jumu'ah due to work duty was not a substantial burden
because Jumu'ah was not "fundamental" to Islam.' 5' The court made this
determination on the basis of the prison chaplain's testimony that "Muslims
may be legitimately excused from Friday services for reasons such as sickness
and work activities.' ' 2
A related way in which courts impose their own interpretations of religions
when applying RFRA is by defining a substantial burden as a burden on a
147. For example. American Jews observe Jewish laws. practices, and ntuals in a variety of
combinations. See NATHAN GLAZER, AMERICAN JUDAISM 132-33 (2d ed. 1972) ("Judaism refers to an
enormous body of practices, embracing one's entire life. more than it refers to a body of doctrmne-).
Muslims also differ widely about religious doctrines and practices. See PATRICK BANNER.MAN. ISLAI IN
PERSPECTIVE: A GUIDE TO ISLAMIC SOCIETY. POLITICS AND LAW 212-13 (1988).
148. Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175. 1179 (7th Cir. 1996).
149. See Qur'an 2:184 (A. Yusuf Ali trans.. 1983) ("(Fasting) for a fixed / Number of days. I But if
any of you is ill, / Or on a journey, / The prescribed number / (Should be made up) / From days later /
For those who can do it / (With hardship), is a ransom. / The feeding of one I That is indigent.-). td. at
6:145 (eating "the flesh of swine" is forbidden, "[b]ut (even so). if a person / Is forced by necessity. /
Without wilful disobedience, / Nor transgressing due limits.- / Thy Lord is Oft-forgiving. / Most
Merciful.").
150. 65 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 1995).
151. See id. at 492.
152. lI at 491.
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religion as a whole.'53 Often, however, particular practices do not appear
"substantial" when compared to the vastness of a religion in its entirety.
Evaluating the substantial burden in this manner, courts determine the
minimum set of practices adequate for prisoners to observe their faiths-an
approach that regresses to one similar to O'Lone's, which viewed religion as
a menu of interchangeable practices.154
In applying their own conceptions of religion under RFRA, many courts
are insensitive to the differences between religious denominations and
individual interpretations of religious doctrine-differences that might not
appear significant to the court but are very important to the adherents. For
example, in Johnson v. Baker,'55 the court held that a Nation of Islam
practitioner was not substantially burdened by attending regular Islamic
services because the court was only aware of two differences between the
faiths: beliefs in reincarnation and bodily positions for prayer 56 The court,
however, did not confirm its findings by examining scholarly literature. Even
if these were the only distinctions, the judge still made a theological
conclusion about the importance of these differences to the believers. Likewise,
in Muhammad v. City of New York Department of Corrections,'57 the court
made judgments about the nature of prisoners' religious experiences: "I find
that the generic Muslim services provide comfort and solace to [Nation of
Islam] members without pressuring such members to commit acts forbidden
by their religion or preventing them from engaging in conduct or having a
religious experience mandated by their faith."' 58 In these and similar
cases, 59 courts became "experts" on comparative religions, determining
153. Only one court has looked at a substantial burden as a burden on a specific religious practice.
See Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215, 217 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("The term 'free exercise of religion,'
however, refers to particular practices of religion, not the practice of religion in general.").
154. See, e.g., Miller-Bey v. Schultz, No. 94-1583, 1996 WL 67941, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1996)
(per curiam) (concluding that prison's disposal of Moorish Science Temple practitioner's nationality card
was not substantial burden because "members who lose their cards are not prohibited from praying, reading
the Koran, or attending religious services"); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1995) (listing
other means by which Pentecostal inmate denied separate group services could practice his religion); Best
v. Kelly, 879 F Supp. 305, 308 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that prison's prohibiting Jewish inmate from
group worship was not substantial burden because he "was allowed to practice his religious beliefs in the
privacy of his cell as he saw fit").
155. No. 94-3828, 1995 WL 570913 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 1995).
156. See id. at *5.
157. 904 F Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
158. Id. at 191.
159. See, e.g., Bryant, 46 F.3d at 949 (holding that denial of separate Pentecostal services was not
substantial burden because general interfaith Christian services for Christians of all denominations was
sufficient); Crosley-EI v. Berge, 896 F. Supp. 885, 888-89 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (holding that denial of
Moorish Science Temple services, despite inmate's claim that his religion was distinct sect from Islam and
that his religion forbade attending regular Muslim services, was not substantial burden because inmate's
faith could be accommodated in general Muslim service); Akbar-el v. Muhammed, 663 N.E.2d 703, 708
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding no substantial burden on Muslims of Moorish Science sect who wanted
separate service from generic Muslim service).
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when a particular sect was distinct enough to deserve a separate religious
leader and worship service.
The insensitive approach many courts are using under RFRA to evaluate
burdens on religion entangles courts too deeply in religious matters beyond
their competence or understanding. '6 Judicial conceptions of religion often
clash with how adherents of a religion understand their own faiths. Subtle
differences in beliefs and practices, unessential in the eyes of many courts, can
be of exceeding importance to the religious adherents, for religious devotion
constitutes more than mere choices or preferences.t
6
The ghost of O'Lone still haunts the case law after RFRA. Many courts
continue to respect the judgment of prison officials while not placing much
weight on the judgment of religious adherents in matters concerning their own
religions. If the free exercise claim does not satisfy the substantial burden test,
the court will dismiss the case without examining the importance of the
penological objective. 162 This result is itself a de facto nonbalance, one in
which the penological interest escapes judicial scrutiny altogether.
B. Nonskeptical Approaches Toward Evaluating Penological Interests
Under RFRA, if a prisoner's claim survives the substantial burden test,
then the court will examine whether the penological interest is compelling and
whether the prison regulation is the least restrictive means for achieving that
interest. Before RFRA, courts consistently afforded deference to the judgment
of prison officials when making this examination. According to the Court in
O'Lone, "[W]e have often said that evaluation of penological objectives is
committed to the considered judgment of prison administrators, 'who are
actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution
under examination. '"1
63
Deference is the decision not to second guess the judgment of an
institution out of respect for its authority and specialization. Judges lack the
expertise of those ensconced in the day-to-day exigencies of prison life. Prison
officials are more capable of anticipating dangers and costs and must bear the
potential perils of a judge's decision to accommodate religion. As the Supreme
160. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exerrise of Religion.
102 HARv. L. REv. 933, 959 (1989) ("[Rlesolving disputes over centrality creates the spectre of religious
experts giving conflicting testimony about the significance of a religious practice, with the state's
decisionmaker authoritatively choosing among them.').
161. See STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 14 (1993) ("Rehligions are more and more
treated as just passing beliefs ... rather than as the fundaments upon which the devout build their lives "')
162. Ira Lupu has argued that the substantial burden test can also serve as a *'gatekeeper* in regular
free exercise cases. See Lupu. supra note 160. at 935.
163. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz. 482 U.S. 342. 349 (19 87 ) (quoting Bell v Wolfish. 441 U S 520.
562 (1979)).
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Court has noted, "[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent
problems of prison administration and reform."'"
However, the necessity and efficacy of many prison regulations are
questionable at best. As one judge has explained: "Prison officials often do not
feel that their primary obligation is the illumination or enforcement of
constitutional rights. It is for this reason that our review cannot be
passive."' 165 While prisons are "the most concrete embodiments of state
power,"' 166 prison officials lack direct accountability to the people, and the
public is relatively unfamiliar with the internal workings of the prisons.
The partisan position of prison officials complicates their ability to draw
a line between regulations that are convenient and those that are necessary.
Several pre-RFRA cases illustrate that prison officials can exaggerate their
claims and can create regulations based on intuition and conjecture. In Hill v.
Blackwell, 67 the court deferred to the judgment of prison officials that a no-
beard regulation served a compelling interest. 68 In his dissent, Judge Richard
Arnold pointed out the exaggerated and "flippant" comments made by the
prison warden, who testified at trial that without the no-beard rule, seventy-five
percent of the inmates would grow beards, requiring the prison to take 10,000
identification photographs per week. 69 Yet Arnold exposed the warden's
hyperbole: Because the prison only had 2150 inmates, the warden's estimates
would result in five photographs of each inmate per week. 71
In Young v. Lane,'7 1 the court upheld a prison regulation that prohibited
Jewish inmates from wearing yarmulkes outside of their cells., 72 The prison
argued that yarmulkes could be used for hiding weapons and for identifying
gang members. 73 However, the prison did allow prisoners to wear baseball
caps at any time. 74 Due to the prison's interest in preventing the smuggling
of contraband, the court in Iron Eyes v. Henry'75 upheld a regulation
requiring short hair that conflicted with the religious beliefs of a Native
American inmate. However, the prison did not bar other potential means of
contraband smuggling such as "bonnets, handkerchiefs, and large boots.,' 76
Cases like these demonstrate the need for courts to examine the claims of
prison administrators carefully.
164. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
165. Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 821-22 (1990) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
166. DIIULIO, supra note 39, at 274.
167. 774 F2d 338 (8th Cir. 1985).
168. See id. at 347.
169. See id. at 348-49 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
170. See id.
171. 922 F2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991).
172. See id. at 377.
173. See id. at 376.
174. See id. at 375.
175. 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990).
176. Id. at 814.
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In creating RFRA, Congress attempted to establish a balance that would
provide robust protection of prisoners' religious rights yet respect the judgment
of prison officials. Thus, while elevating the level of scrutiny for prisoners'
religious rights, Congress also instructed courts to maintain the deference
traditionally afforded to prison officials. The Senate Report declared that under
RFRA, the courts should still give "due deference to the experience and
expertise of prison and jail administrators." 17' According to the House
Report, "examination of such regulations in light of a higher standard does not
mean the expertise and authority of military and prison officials will be
necessarily undermined."' 8
However, there is a fundamental tension between scrutiny and deference.
Both scrutiny and deference are instructions to courts about how skeptically
they should evaluate and probe regulations. The critical difference between the
various levels of scrutiny is the rigor of the courts' examination-and
consequently, the weight of the burden on rulemakers to justify the tailoring
of their rules. Deference dilutes a court's critical powers; the more deferential
a court becomes, the less it investigates the regulation and the more it accepts
the opinions of those who designed the regulation. Deference inclines toward
an approach with a low degree of skepticism, and a nonskeptical approach can
reduce even the highest level of judicial scrutiny to the virtual equivalent of
minimal scrutiny. At its strongest level, deference leads to an approach
identical to the "hands off' doctrine. In fact, courts often incorporate the level
of deference in the standard of review.7 9 As Justice Blackmun has remarked,
courts can "substitute the rhetoric of judicial deference for meaningful scrutiny
of constitutional claims in the prison setting.""
While the articulated level of scrutiny provides some guidance to judges
about the level of skepticism to employ, deference remains a wild card. When
navigating the competing demands of scrutiny and deference, skeptical courts
demand more facts and data before deciding, requiring prison officials to
substantiate their policies with sufficient evidence. For example, under
O'Lone's minimal scrutiny test, a skeptical court struck down a prison policy
that forced a Rastafarian inmate to shave his dreadlocks for an identification
photograph, questioning the regulation and discussing the potentially less
restrictive alternative of tying his hair back in ponytails."' In contrast, other
courts employ a nonskeptical approach, deferring almost completely to prison
officials no matter how speculative the policy. For example, a nonskeptical
177. S. REP. NO. 103-I1l, at 10 (1993). reprwned n 1993 U.S C.C.A.N 1892. 1900
178. H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 8 (1993).
179. See, e.g.. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz. 482 U.S. 342. 349 (1987) ("To ensure that courts afford
appropriate deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to infnngc
constitutional rights are judged under a 'reasonableness' test. ,. "),
180. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576. 593 (1984) (Blackmun. J.. concumng).
181. See Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571. 577 (2d Cir. 1990).
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court applying RFRA's more rigorous strict scrutiny test sustained a regulation
forcing a Hasidic Jew to receive a haircut.182 The court concluded that
"[s]ome interests, like quick identification, cannot be realistically achieved by
any other method."'' 83 Nothing in the opinion indicated that the court
considered the alternatives raised in other cases. Thus the vigor of scrutiny
turns not on the level articulated by the courts, but on how skeptically courts
analyze a regulation.'8 4
Under RFRA, the courts remain divided between skeptical and
nonskeptical approaches. While several courts have probed for more facts,' 5
most courts have interpreted Congress's call for deference as requiring the
withdrawal of skepticism of prison regulations. A clear example of the contrast
between these approaches under RFRA is Hamilton v. Schriro.186 When a
Native American inmate challenged a prison's hair regulations, 187 the district
court applied a skeptical form of strict scrutiny; noting that other maximum
security jails permitted long hair, the court chastised the prison officials for
failing to search for creative solutions.' 88 However, the court of appeals
reversed, ruling that "[t]he district court failed to give due deference to prison
officials' testimony that long hair presented a risk to prison safety and security
and that no viable less restrictive means of achieving that goal existed." 8 9
The court of appeals deferred to the officials' testimony that the regulation was
the least restrictive means.
Nonskeptical courts under RFRA are failing to question the conclusory
statements of prison officials.' 90 For example, in Diaz v. Collins,'9' the
court held that a hair regulation conflicting with a Native American inmate's
182. See Phipps v. Parker, 879 F. Supp. 734, 736 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
183. Id.
184. This phenomenon is also exemplified by the pre-O'Lone hair and beard prison regulation cases
discussed supra text accompanying notes 84-94.
185. See, e.g., Moorish Science Temple v. Benson, No. 95-2549, 1996 WL 280076, at *2 (8th Cir.
May 29, 1996) (denying summary judgment because prison officials failed to explain how allowing inmates
to add suffixes to their names would lead to identification problems); Estep v. Dent, 914 F. Supp. 1462,
1467 (W.D. Ky. 1996) (shaving earlocks of Hasidic Jew not least restrictive means of achieving security);
Campbell-El v. District of Columbia, 874 F. Supp. 403, 408 (D.D.C. 1994) ("[The Court needs a more
detailed description by the government as to how [blanket restriction on gatherings of more than ten or
twelve prisoners in cellblock] is the least restrictive means for furthering its goals.").
186. 863 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996).
187. The inmate also challenged the prison's complete ban on sweat lodge ceremonies. See infra notes
205, 242-44 and accompanying text.
188. See Hamilton, 863 F Supp. at 1023-24.
189. 74 F.3d 1545, 1555 (8th Cir. 1996).
190. See, e.g., Smith v. Beatty, No. 95-1493, 1996 WL 166270, at *2 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 1996)
(concluding, without in-depth analysis of specific facts, that prison policy satisfied least restrictive means
test); George v. Sullivan, 896 F Supp. 895, 898 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (accepting, without evidentiary support,
claim by prison officials that prohibiting racially derogatory religious publications was least restrictive
means of preventing animosity and violence); Akbar-EI v. Muhammed, 663 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (failing to question prison chaplain's statement that altering four generic religious
groupings-Protestant, Roman Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish-would "far exceed our ability" and would
create security problems).
191. 872 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
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religious beliefs was the least restrictive means to prevent hidden contraband
and to facilitate quick identification.' 92 The court dismissed the inmate's
argument that the prison's interest was not compelling because female
prisoners were permitted to have long hair.' 9 The court concluded: "The
potential of hiding contraband in long hair cannot be vitiated except through
a regulation that hair be kept short."'9' The phrasing of this conclusion is
tautological; what is missing is the thorough nalysis that strict scrutiny
demands. The court failed to examine the likelihood that contraband would be
concealed by inmates with long hair, the adequacy of other methods to prevent
hidden contraband, the possibility of effective ways to search inmates' hair,
and the merits of the policies and practices employed by other prisons.
When courts do not demand substantial evidence to justify prison
regulations, there is no way to distinguish the prison's claims from mere
speculation. For example, in Reese v. Coughlin,'" the prison prohibited a
prisoner from possessing tarot cards because "the cards can be used to gain
psychological control or influence over other inmates."" The court
summarily dismissed the case based on this justification without requiring
corroborating evidence, testimony from psychological experts, or any further
explanation.
Although strict scrutiny requires that the prison bear the burden of
justifying its policies, many courts applying RFRA are virtually waiving this
burden in the name of deference. Some courts are even placing the burden on
the prisoner. 97 In Loden v. Peters,'"5 the court permitted a prison to
confiscate a book related to a prisoner's religion based on the findings of two
prison committees that the book "pose[d] a clear and present danger to safety
based upon its promotion of violent acts."'9' Since the prisoner did not
"challenge these findings," the court held that the prison satisfied the
compelling interest test.2i °
Courts using nonskeptical approaches diminish the vigor of RFRA's strict
scrutiny by failing to examine less restrictive alternatives-even ones raised
in other cases or practiced in other prisons. Under RFRA's least restrictive
means test, some courts have upheld prison policies that censored potentially
192. See id. at 359.
193. See id. at 359 n.4.
194. Id. at 359.
195. No. 93 Civ. 4748 (LAP), 1996 WL 374166 (S.D N Y Jul) 3. 19961
196. Id. at *8.
197. Quoting Justice Blackmun that only an "unimaginative" judge "could not come up %%ith something
a little less 'drastic' or a little less 'restrictive' in almost any situation." the court in Hamilton v Schrro.
74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996), concluded that although there might "be less restnctive means of achieving
prison safety and security than completely prohibiting sweat lodge ceremonies." the prisoner "has failed
to enlighten us as to any viable less restrictive means." Id. at 1556
198. No. 92 C20209, 1995 WL 89951 (N.D. Ill. Mar. I. 1995)
199. Id. at *10.
200. Id.
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dangerous publications 20t without considering the alternative (used by
another prison) of redacting the problematic portions."3 One court entirely
prohibited Native American sweat lodge ceremonies203 due to safety
concerns, 204 although other maximum security facilities allowed these
ceremonies.0 5 Several courts upheld hair regulations"4 despite the fact that
numerous other prisons permitted long hair and beards, satisfying their
penological interests in other ways.2°
Due to nonskeptical approaches, cases decided under RFRA's strict
scrutiny have resulted in outcomes comparable to cases decided under
O'Lone's minimal scrutiny. Although Congress intended RFRA to provide a
uniform heightened protection of free exercise rights in all prisons, many
courts have failed to raise the level of protection when applying RFRA.
C. Nonskepticism and Insensitivity
The problem of nonskepticism not only affects the compelling interest side
of the balance, but also intensifies the problem of insensitivity by adversely
affecting the substantial burden valuation. Under RFRA, in addition to being
deferential to prison officials' judgment about penological concerns, some
judges have relied on the judgments of prison authorities about the religion of
prisoners. These courts have deferred to prison officials for both sides of the
balance.
In several cases under RFRA, courts have accepted without question the
theological conceptions of prison officials. For example, in cases involving
religious sects that desire separate worship services, courts have rarely
questioned the divisions that the prison established between religious
denominations.0 8 In addition, some courts have based their understanding of
the prisoners' religious beliefs on the testimony of the prison chaplain, an
employee of the penal institution.0 9 This reliance is problematic because the
201. See George v. Sullivan, 896 F Supp. 895, 898 (W.D. Wis. 1995); Loden, 1995 WL 89951, at
*10.
202. See Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 504-05 (1Ith Cir. 1996) (describing prison's redaction
policy).
203. A sweat lodge is a Native American place of worship, a "small enclosure constructed of bent
withes covered with skins or blankets ... that encloses heat for a sweat bath." SAM D. GILL & IRENE .
SULLIVAN, DICTIONARY OF NATIVE AMERICAN MYTHOLOOY 293 (1992).
204. See Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1556 (8th Cir. 1996).
205. See Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing sweat lodge facility at
Oregon State Penitentiary).
206. See, e.g., Hamilton, 74 F3d at 1555; Phipps v. Parker, 879 F. Supp. 734, 736 (W.D. Ky. 1995);
Diaz v. Collins, 872 F. Supp. 353, 359 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
207. See Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, 432 F. Supp. 947, 950 n.8 (D. Conn. 1977) (describing survey
revealing that more than 23 state prison systems permitted beards); infra notes 236-38.
208. See, e.g., Bryant v. Gomez, 46 E3d 948, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Baker, No. 94-3828,
1995 WL 570913, at *5 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 1995); Crosley-El v. Berge, 896 F. Supp. 885, 888-89 (E.D.
Wis. 1995); Akbar-EI v. Muhammed, 663 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
209. See, e.g., Best v. Kelly, 879 F. Supp. 305, 309 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
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prison chaplain can be partisan to the interests of the prison, and inmates, who
often proceed pro se, may not have the resources to obtain their own experts
or the ability to articulate their point of view adequately. For example, in
Abdur-Ralnan v. Michigan Department of Corrections,2' 0 the court held that
Jumu'ah was not fundamental to Islam based solely on the testimony of the
prison chaplain who noted that work was a valid excuse for missing the
service.21' Rather than assessing the substantial burden test in an independent
and neutral way, the court deferred to a partisan prison employee to perform
this task.
One of the most subtle manners in which some courts have undervalued
prisoners' religious freedom is the way in which they have focused on the
balancing test. Caught up in the question of how to divide up scant resources,
some judges have ignored the question of the prison's valuation of religion in
general. In Merritt-Bey v. Deto,'" the prison kept a "canteen" of funds for
religious groups. Inmates belonging to the Moorish Science Temple religion
claimed that they were receiving fewer funds than other religions. The court
ruled that the inmates failed to prove a substantial burden and held that prisons
do not have to allocate resources equally among all religious groups.'2
However, the court neglected to question the total amount of funds the prison
allocated to the religion "canteen" by not inquiring whether this amount was
too small to protect the religious rights of all the inmates in the prison.
In Woods v. Evatt,214 Muslim inmates filed a RFRA action because
Christian inmates received superior accommodations for their worship. While
Christians could use the visitation room for services, which permitted worship
with family and friends, the Muslims were not allowed to use this room for
their Friday Jurnu'ah service. In addition, the prison allowed gifts in December
but not during the Muslim holiday season.2"5 The court held that the inmates
failed the substantial burden test because accommodation did not have to be
equal for all religious groups. 216 The prison contained 450 Christian prisoners
and only 88 Muslims. 217 Using the visitation room on Fridays for Muslim
services would disrupt visitation hours; Christian services occurred on Sunday,
presenting no visitation conflicts.28
However, the court failed to consider that perhaps the very reason
visitation hours did not occur on Sundays was because of the tradition of
Sunday worship for Christians. Perhaps the prison's structure and routines were
210. 65 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 1995).
211. See id. at 491.
212. No. 93-2194. 1994 WL 263780 (8th Cir. June 17. 1994)
213. See id. at *1-2.
214. 876 F. Supp. 756 (D.S.C. 1995).
215. See id. at 762-63.
216. See id. at 766.
217. See id. at 765.
218. See id. at 764.
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designed around Christian traditions. The problem might have been solved by
rescheduling Friday visitation hours, yet the court did not consider this
possibility; rather, it accepted the existing structure of prison practices as
immutable. While the court's decision seemed reasonable given the space and
budgetary constraints set up by the prison, the court did not question the
parameters constructed by the prison authorities.
III. FAITH IN THE FUTURE?
In enacting RFRA, Congress sought to raise the level of scrutiny in
prisoners' religious rights cases. It depended upon the courts to put this greater
protection into effect; however, RFRA's strict scrutiny standard has failed to
clarify and stabilize this turbulent and troubled area of law. The way courts
approach the balancing, not the articulated level of scrutiny, controls the
amount of protection afforded to prisoners' religious rights. The tendencies of
insensitivity and nonskepticism, prevalent in pre-RFRA case law, continue to
thrive under RFRA and undercut its heightened level of protection.
This Part will propose measures to help guide judicial application of
RFRA's strict scrutiny faithfully according to Congress's intent. Ultimately,
there is no magic formula that will force courts to decide these cases properly;
judges themselves must reform how they balance prisoners' RFRA cases.
Otherwise, RFRA will remain a facade behind which many courts continue to
balance in much the same way as the Court did in O'Lone.
A. Evaluating Burdens on Religion
Although Congress understood that protection of religious liberty could not
be entrusted to majoritarian politics,"19 the insensitive approach used by
many courts under RFRA assumes that all faiths fit majoritarian conceptions
of religion. In order to evaluate burdens on religions more accurately, courts
should weigh burdens on religious practices with sensitivity to the perspective
of the adherent. This is best accomplished by using a sincerity test to
determine whether prisoners are sincere in their claims that their religions are
substantially burdened.
The sincerity test is not new; before RFRA, it was often a subcomponent
of the substantial burden test, and in some cases, was used in lieu of the
substantial burden inquiry.220 It requires that the balancing must be done with
a conscientious effort to understand the perspective of the religious adherent.
219. See H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 2-5; S. REP. NO. 103-11I, at 4-7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1892, 1893-97.
220. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944) (holding that juries may determine
sincerity, not truthfulness, of religious beliefs).
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Under this test, religious experience is valued in a way that better reflects its
importance to the individuals involved.
Jolly v. Coughlin22 ' decided under RFRA, provides an example of the
way courts might approach this inquiry. In Jolly, a Rastafarian prisoner refused
to submit to a tuberculosis test due to his religion. As a result, the prison kept
him confined in medical "keeplock" for over three years. The court looked to
whether the prisoner was being sincere in his claim or was merely filing a
frivolous lawsuit. 22 The court concluded that the prisoner's 'steadfast
adherence" to what he interpreted as the tenets of his faith, as evidenced by his
willingness to remain confined in medical "keeplock" for such a long period
of time, confirmed the sincerity of his beliefs.22'
The sincerity test focuses on the prisoner's statements and testimony.
Courts cannot rely merely on the testimony of prison chaplains. When the
prisoner's allegations are scant, courts should request more specific information
from the prisoner. For example, in Johnson v. Baker,2 the court should
have attempted to learn about the differences between Islam and the Nation of
Islam by requesting additional information from the prisoner, consulting texts
about these religions,2  or seeking advice from a nonpartisan Islamic leader.
Of course, the court should not rely only on outside sources-for each person
is entitled to exercise her faith in a manner that is unique and nontraditional.
The central inquiry for the court should have been whether the prisoner was
using religion as a ploy to dress up a frivolous lawsuit. Outside sources should
be consulted if the court suspects that the prisoner is making up wild
allegations.
Ultimately, the substantial burden test is not where the balancing should
be done; most RFRA cases should be decided on the compelling state interest
and least restrictive means tests. It is better for a prisoner to lose in this more
direct balancing than to lose because a judge misunderstands and undervalues
her religion. Not all claims will survive the sincerity test. In Prins v.
Coughlin,226 an inmate who was transferred to another prison claimed that
the facility provided only cold kosher food whereas the kosher diet at the other
prison contained hot food items. If, after an inquiry by the court, the prisoner
could not show how the qualitative difference in the kosher diets affected the
practice of his religion, this RFRA claim would fail the sincerity test.
221. 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996).
222. See id. at 476.
223. See id. (quoting Jolly v. Coughlin, 894 F. Supp. 734. 743 IS D N Y 19951)
224. No. 94-3828, 1995 WL 570913 (6th Cir. Sept. 27. 1995)
225. An examination of some of the literature about the Nation of Islam reeals that under its current
leader, Louis Farrakhan, the Nation of Islam has distanced itself from the regular Islamic community See
Albert J. Raboteau, Muslim Movements, in I THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 100. 102 Mircca Ehade
ed., 1987). For example, the Nation of Islam differs from other Muslim groups in its strong emphasis on
African-American oppression. See Akbar Muhammad, Muslims in the United States. in TilE ISL%,ItC
IMPACT 195, 210 (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad et al. eds., 1984)
226. 94 Civ. 2053 (MBM), 1995 WL 378526 (S.D.N.Y. June 26. 1995)
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Of course, courts can use sincerity as a proxy for injecting their own
prejudices and ignorance into the balance. A sincerity test demands a judgment
about the credibility and honesty of the prisoner, which can be influenced by
the eccentricity or unpopularity of the beliefs. As Professor Barbara Flagg
notes, "[a]t a minimum, some objective manifestation of subjective experience
must be present for that experience to be cognizable by others. 227 Any type
of judgment is always subject to these limitations; while a sincerity approach
is not perfect, it encourages courts to focus on the prisoner's point of view
rather than on a myopic and inaccurate conception of religion such as the
central tenet test.
B. Probing the Facts
Although Congress sent conflicting signals when it combined strict
scrutiny with deference, Congress wanted prison regulations to be examined
thoroughly and carefully. The Senate Report on RFRA provided that
"[i]nadequately formulated prison regulations and policies grounded on mere
speculation, exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice to
meet the act's requirements. 228 Likewise, the House Report emphasized that
"[s]eemingly reasonable regulations based upon speculation, exaggerated fears
of thoughtless policies cannot stand. 229 In these reports, Congress instructed
courts to be skeptical of the claims of prison officials. Moreover, the reports'
explicit critique of O'Lone and the Senate's rejection of the Reid amendment
indicate that Congress wanted the courts to abandon O'Lone's low level of
scrutiny. Unfortunately, many courts have continued to employ nonskeptical
approaches that have reduced RFRA to the functional equivalent of minimal
scrutiny.
The best way to remain faithful to the intent of Congress-and to resolve
the conflicting instructions of deference and strict scrutiny-is for courts to
adopt a skeptical approach. Informed balancing depends upon a diligent, fair,
and neutral examination of the facts. Burdens on religions or penological
interests cannot be balanced based on mere guesswork or reliance on partisan
players in the dispute. In his dissent in Giano v. Senkowski,230 Judge Guido
Calabresi aptly declared: "Words are cheap and facts are often surprising and
always essential. Whenever the validity of claims by those in authority is
measured through surmise, prejudgment and intuition in summary settings
rather than through data demonstrated at leisure, the constitutional freedoms
227. Barbara J. Flagg, The Algebra of Pluralism: Subjective Experience as a Constitutional Variable,
47 VAND. L. REv. 273, 318 (1994).
228. S. REP. No. 103-111, at 10 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900.
229. H. REP. No. 103-88, at 8 (1993).
230. 54 F.3d 1050 (2d Cir. 1995).
[Vol. 106: 459
Religion in the Prisons
of us all are put in peril."23' Courts applying RFRA should demand more
empirical and factual support from prisons. Strict scrutiny demands that the
burden fall squarely on prison officials to produce this information-not on
prisoners lacking sophisticated knowledge about how prisons can accomplish
their goals.
For example, in Lawson v. Singletary,-2 the prison maintained a
redaction policy towards religious literature containing racist language. The
court properly concluded that since this policy only deleted specific portions
and did not ban the publications entirely, it satisfied RFRA's least restrictive
means test.233 Further, the court correctly remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether specific redactions were valid under RFRA and the
Constitution.234 The court noted that the prison should not be "required to
adduce specific evidence of a causal link between text that it wants to remove
and actual incidents of violence.2 35 While the court's statement should not
be interpreted as permitting the prison to avoid supplying any support for its
redactions, the prison should not have to produce evidence of an almost certain
correlation between racist language and violence.
The purpose of the judiciary is to serve as an impartial arbiter. The fact
that courts are not swept up in the day-to-day administration of prisons is thus
a virtue, not a defect. Courts are insulated from the biases and habitual
thinking that comes from working within prison administration. Outside of the
fray, courts can infuse creativity into the process. Creative solutions do exist.
In Helbrans v. Coombe,236 an Orthodox Jewish prisoner who did not want
to shave his head and beard had a computer-generated image without hair for
the necessary identification photos.2 37 And in a pre-RFRA case, the court
ruled that a prisoner who was required to receive a haircut for initial
identification photographs could have his hair pulled back rather than cut.2"
Courts must go beyond merely focusing on particular prison regulations.
Many prison regulations burdening religion are inconsistent with other policies.
For example, the regulations designed to prevent contraband smuggling in
Young v. Lane239 and Iron Eyes v. Henr ,240 prohibited yarmulkes and long
hair, respectively, but did not bar other potential means to hide weapons.2 '"
Discrepancies in prison policies such as these should be grounds for substantial
skepticism about the prison's compelling interest. A prison regulation cannot
231. Id. at 1062 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
232. 85 F.3d 502 (11th Cir. 1996).
233. See id. at 513.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 513 n.15.
236. 890 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
237. See id. at 230.
238. See People v. Lewis, 502 N.E.2d 988. 989 (N Y 1986)
239. 922 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991).
240. 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 171-76 for a dtscussion of these cases
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be viewed in isolation, but only in conjunction with the overall structure of
prison life.
Courts should also request that prisons do a more detailed analysis of
various alternatives to their current policies. Perhaps the best empirical data
about what practices can and cannot be accommodated without jeopardizing
safety comes from examining what other prisons-in the United States and
elsewhere-are actually doing. For example, in Hamilton v. Schriro242 the
court rejected a Native American inmate's request for a sweat lodge ceremony
because of safety concerns even though several other prisons successfully
operated sweat lodge facilities for their inmates.243 The court should have
investigated the cost and safety problems of providing sweat lodges at these
prisons. In fact, a good way to learn about penology is to examine the effects
of various penal practices across the country. In Moskowitz v. Wilkinson,244
for instance, the court conducted a survey of state prison hair regulations,245
in an effort to acquire an independent basis for its decision. Not only will such
information prove useful for judges in rendering decisions, but it will force
prisons to share knowledge about penal practices.
Another possible means for courts to analyze and study penological
interests is to appoint a special master. The special master would spend time
studying the prison and report back with various observations and suggestions.
Rather than proceed with an adversarial proceeding, courts should request that
prison officials draft creative solutions which could then be shared with other
prisons.
IV. CONCLUSION
At its best, balancing is a detailed and open examination into the
justification, scope, and efficiency of the regulation in question. Balancing is
a way for courts to reconcile, in an honest and public way, the competing
interests of the individual and the community. If balancing is to be done
carefully and candidly, courts must assign values only after diligent study of
both sides. In the words of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo: "If you ask how [the
judge] is to know when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that
he must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and
study and reflection ... 246
242. 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996).
243. See id. at 1555-56. The district court noted that "[m]aximum security correctional facilities in
other states permit sweat lodge ceremonies and the growth of long hair." Hamilton v. Schriro, 863 F. Supp.
1019, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1994). In addition, the plaintiff's religion was accommodated in the prison in the
state of Washington before he was transferred to Missouri. See id. at 1022.
244. 432 F. Supp. 947 (D. Conn. 1977).
245. See id. at 950 n.8.
246. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).
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Unfortunately, these ideals are not embodied by many courts when
balancing religion in prisons. RFRA, with its strict scrutiny protection, seemed
to be a ray of hope for prisoners, a powerful protection of religious free
exercise, a commitment by our government to respect religious liberty
everywhere, even in our prisons. RFRA's idealistic origins, its pluralistic
aspirations, and its strict scrutiny protection cannot venture into the harsh
universe of the prison without the aid of the courts. Until the courts properly
balance religion and penological interests under RFRA, the only increased
protection prisoners will have is our prayers.

